There is not yet a comprehensive body of appellate law governing AI discovery. But several recent federal decisions illustrate how courts are applying familiar discovery doctrines to this new technology.
In United States v. Heppner, 820 F. Supp. 3d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2026), a criminal defendant used Anthropic’s Claude platform to research potential charges and defenses in connection with a pending criminal investigation. Some of those exchanges incorporated information relating to conversations the defendant later had with counsel.
The court held that the defendant’s communications with Claude were not protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. The communications were made to a publicly available AI platform—not to counsel—and were disclosed to the third-party provider under circumstances that defeated the requisite confidentiality. Nor did the defendant’s subsequent decision to share the materials with counsel retroactively confer privilege on communications that were unprotected when created.
Although Heppner arose in a criminal prosecution, its reasoning has broader implications. A businessperson who uses a public AI platform to analyze the facts of an emerging commercial dispute should not assume that those exchanges will receive the same protection as confidential communications with counsel.
On the other hand, in Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 3d 629 (E.D.Mich. 2026), the court held that a pro se plaintiff’s use of ChatGPT to assist with litigation did not waive work-product protection. The court reasoned that AI tools, such as ChatGPT, are not “persons” under the legal framework governing work-product waiver. The Warner court reasoned that waiver of work-product protection requires disclosure to an adversary or in a manner likely to reach an adversary, which did not occur in this instance.
The court determined that the materials generated using ChatGPT reflected litigation-related mental impressions and strategies, qualifying them for work-product protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). The court emphasized that the use of AI tools in litigation does not inherently waive such protection, as disclosure to an AI tool does not equate to disclosure to an adversary.
The court’s decision was grounded in the principle that work-product protection is not waived unless materials are disclosed in a manner that makes them accessible to an adversary. The court did not suggest that all uses of AI tools in litigation would automatically qualify for work-product protection; rather, the protection applied in this case because the materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation and were not disclosed to an adversary.
The two cases are not necessarily inconsistent. But rather illustrate an important point: the discoverability of an AI conversation will depend heavily upon who created it, why it was created, what it contains, and what privilege or work-product protection applies.
So, what does the evolving landscape mean practically?